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ABSTRACT. Theological ethics, particularly Christian theological ethics, is
very  well-equipped both  to  treat  the  interests  and  needs  of  future
generations as a genuine and pressing concern – and also to evade
some of the questions they pose about temporality,  by appealing to
judgement  beyond  history.  Phenomenological  approaches  to  the
question of future generations are important  as a counterbalance to
this tendency in theological ethics, insofar as they force us to remain
with, and wrestle with, the relation to future persons as future. In this
article I show that drawing on phenomenological approaches, in order
to  attend  to  temporality,  produces  an  account  of  justice  and
responsibility  to  future  generations  that  is  more  adequate
theologically,  as  well  as  ethically.  Attending  to  how  the  other,  the
future and the imperative of justice interrelate yields an approach to
theological  ethics  that  does  not  need  to  assume for  the  ethicist the
God’s-eye  view  –  the  view  from  outside  time,  narrative  or
interpersonal encounter – and that is thus able to grapple with the
core questions raised by bringing future generations into ethics. 
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1. Introduction
How does attention to future generations reshape ethical thought? It
might  seem  obvious  that  thinking  about  future  generations  brings
temporality and otherness into the centre of ethics. At the very least,
thinking  about  future  generations  should  force  us  to  notice  and
reconsider  unspoken  assumptions,  in  our  understandings  of  justice
and responsibility, about the presence, the availability to thought, or
the agency, of ethical subjects. However, in practice several of the most
influential treatments of the subject avoid this reconsideration. Some
attempt to integrate future generations into existing patterns of ethical
or economic calculus by spatializing the temporal difference between
ourselves  and  future  generations,  for  example  by  processes  of
discounting or by treating future generations as «distant strangers».1
Others seek to bring all generations into a shared ethical space and to
deny temporal gaps between them for the purposes of justice – and yet
others, albeit controversially, question the coherence of talking about
«future persons» as ethical subjects at all.2 
Theological  ethics,  particularly  Christian  theological  ethics  –  as  I
have argued elsewhere – is distinctively well-equipped both to treat
the interests and needs of future generations as a genuine and pressing
concern,  and  to  evade  some  of  the  questions  they  pose  about
temporality.  The  idea  of  judgement  beyond  history  –  of  an
eschatological summing-up of history that includes all generations, of
the truth about human action being revealed  sub specie aeternitatis in
the divine vision that holds past, present and future together– creates,
it  has  been  argued,  an  obvious  imperative  to  consider  future
generations as fellow members of the human community. Certainly it
puts a check on the inclination to focus exclusively on the needs and
1 For a (relatively) recent discussion of the ethical issues around discounting in relation to
climate  change,  see  ROEMER 2011  and  the  rejoinder  in  DASGUPTA 2011.  On  future
generations as «distant strangers», see O’NEILL 1994.
2 The  most  famous  example  of  the  former  is  John  Rawls’  abolition  of  generational
separation behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ – RAWLS 1971, 284-90 and 587. The most famous
example of the latter is PARFIT 1982.
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interests  of  the  present.   However,  it  also  invites  the  ethicist  or
theologian herself to adopt the viewpoint ‘from eternity’ – and hence
to fail to reckon with the futurity of future generations.3 
Phenomenological approaches to the question of future generations
are  important  as  a  counterbalance  to  this  tendency  in  theological
ethics, insofar as they force us to remain with, and wrestle with, the
relation to future persons as future. As I seek to demonstrate in what
follows,  this  does  not  in  turn  mean  that  theological  and
phenomenological  approaches  to  future  generations  are  inherently
opposed.  On  the  contrary,  thinking  carefully  about  temporality
produces an account of justice and responsibility to future generations
that  is  more  adequate  theologically,  as  well  as  ethically;  and  this
becomes particularly clear when we bring questions about temporality
and otherness to the reading of scriptural texts. Attending to how the
other,  the  future  and the  imperative  of  justice  interrelate  yields  an
approach to theological  ethics that  does not  need to assume  for  the
ethicist  the God’s-eye view – the view from outside time, narrative or
interpersonal encounter – and that is thus able to grapple with the
core questions raised by bringing future generations into ethics.4
  
2. The Neighbour and the Future: Poverty and Time in
a Troubling Text
My focus in this article is a well-known and widely-used text from the
Hebrew Bible5 on poverty and need, together with its quotation  and
3 I discuss this at more length in MUERS 2008, 17-30.  
4 In  integrating  philosophical,  theological  and  textual  approaches  I  take  an  approach
similar  to  that  of  Robert  Gibbs,  Claire  Elise  Katz,  and others  who read Lévinas  (for
example) as a reinterpreter of texts as well as a re-former of phenomenology – and who
draw out the philosophical significance of his text-based writings. GIBBS 1994; KATZ 2003.
My  method  for  working  with  scriptural  texts  is  strongly  influenced  by  ‘scriptural
reasoning’  as  it  has  developed  in  relation  to  postmodern  Jewish  philosophy  and
postliberal Christian theology; see on this FORD AND PECKNOLD 2006.
5 Which I discuss here both as TaNaKh and as Old Testament – that is, as it is read as
Jewish and as Christian scripture.
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reinterpretation in the New Testament. The core phrase, given at the
beginning  of  this  article,  is  from  Deuteronomy 15:11  and Matthew
26:11– given here both in the forms in which it has most often been
quoted in English and in the translation now favoured for English-
language academic use.
…the poor will never cease from out of the land  / the poor
ye have always with you (King James Version) 6
…there will never cease to be some in need on the earth /
you always have the poor with you (New Revised Standard
Version)
While being taken as a key text for the overall shape of ethics (by both
Jewish  and  Christian  interpreters),  Deuteronomy  15:11  has  been
subject to frequent ideological reappropriation. In Western Christian
contexts  –  particularly  Britain  and North  America  –  it  has  shaped
economics and welfare policies, as well as individual morality. It is not,
at first glance, a text about future generations; but by its invocation of
an indefinite future, in the context (as we shall see later) of a summons
to  responsibility  and to  acts  of  justice,  it  raises  sharp  issues  about
temporality in relation to ethics. I have argued elsewhere that concern
for  future  generations  is  not  a  sub-topic  within  ethics  that  can  be
treated according to principles already established, but rather a stance
that affects the way in which all ethics is done.7 It is from that starting-
point that, in this article, I re-examine texts about poverty, need and
justice  –  first  to  understand what  this  stance  of  concern  for  future
generations might look like, and second to understand how that stance
affects approaches to poverty and need.
I note, to begin with, that when this text was and is cited in relation
to welfare policies and wealth inequality, its orientation to time plays
an important and often negative role. To give a representative example
6 ‘The poor will never cease from out of the land’ is the King James Version translation of
Deuteronomy 15:11;  the  equivalent  verse  in  the  New Testament,  Matthew  26:11  and
parallels, is ‘ye have the poor always with you’. 
7 MUERS 2008; see also MUERS 2004. 
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– when used by Rick Perry to claim divine sanction for downplaying
the role of government in reducing poverty, it evokes a stable order of
society  to  counter  dangerous  suggestions  that  progress  might  be
possible or desirable. 
[Rick Perry] was asked about the growing gap between rich
and poor in Texas…
“Biblically, the poor are always going to be with us in some
form or fashion,” he said…
Perry  acknowledged  that  the  richest  Texans  have
experienced the greatest amount of earnings growth, but
dismissed the notion that income inequality is a problem in
the state, saying, “We don’t grapple with that here”.8
For Perry the main enactment of responsibility to future generations,
as  justified  and  mandated  by  scriptural  texts  like  Deuteronomy
15:11/Matthew 26:11, is maintaining things as they are – and keeping
a  check  on  any  attempt  to  alter  the  present  order  that  keeps  all
generations  in  the  same  eternally-mandated  moral  situation.  In
another time and place, when «the poor will never cease from out of
the land» was inscribed on the foundation stone of a workhouse in
Victorian England,9 it  spatialized and sequestered «the poor» as an
enduring  if  troubling  feature  of  the  social  landscape  –  for  whom
enduring institutionalised provision would need to be made. In the
context of the Malthusian economics that still dominated attitudes to
poverty in the wake of the 1842 poor law reform, it also named the
perceived  threat  of  increasing  population,  of  intergenerational
«pauperism»-  and  of  the  failure  of  poverty  to  perform  its  proper
function as a spur to thrift, hard work and progress. 
Both of  these  illustrative  examples  use  Deuteronomy 15:11,  or  its
near-repetition in Matthew 26:11, to ground or support an overview –
8 DRUCKER 2014.
9 The Woolwich Union workhouse in London, founded in 1870; see London Metropolitan
Archives, n.d. 
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we might say, a God’s-eye view, a view from beyond intergenerational
succession - of the meaning of poverty within history. Both pull the
text out of any narrative context in order to let it stand as a general
statement of the configuration of human affairs – on the basis of which
deductions can be made about appropriate large-scale responses that
will  either maintain the status quo for future generations, or secure
rationally-directed progress. 
As  critical  commentators  have noted,  however,  to  re-contextualise
the  quotation  –  particularly  in  Deuteronomy  15  –  complicates  the
picture  considerably.10 My  argument  in  what  follows  is  that  this
recontextualisation, by restoring questions of temporality and alterity
to the conversation about poverty and justice, opens up a conversation
about justice to future generations.
1Every seventh year you shall  grant a remission of debts.
2And this  is  the  manner  of  the remission:  every creditor
shall  remit  the claim that  is  held against  a neighbor,  not
exacting  it  of  a  neighbor  who  is  a  member  of  the
community,  because  the  LORD’s  remission  has  been
proclaimed. 3Of a foreigner you may exact it, but you must
remit  your  claim  on  whatever  any  member  of  your
community owes you.  4There will,  however,  be no one in
need among you, because the  LORD is sure to bless you in
the  land  that  the  LORD your  God  is  giving  you  as  a
possession to occupy,  5if only you will obey the LORD your
God by diligently observing this entire commandment that
I  command  you  today.  6When  the  LORD your  God  has
blessed you,  as he promised you, you will  lend to many
nations, but you will not borrow; you will rule over many
nations, but they will not rule over you. 
7If there is among you anyone in need, a member of your
10 See  BRUEGGEMANN 2001,  169:  «By  itself  that  statement  has  been  misread  to  sustain
indifference  toward  the  poor  because  nothing  can  be  done  about  poverty  anyway.
Nothing could be more remote from this text, however, than passive indifference…»
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community in any of your towns within the land that the
Lord your God is  giving you,  do not  be hard-hearted or
tight-fisted  towards  your  needy  neighbour.  8You  should
rather open your hand, willingly lending enough to meet
the need, whatever it may be.  9Be careful that you do not
entertain a mean thought, thinking, “The seventh year, the
year of remission, is near”, and therefore view your needy
neighbour with hostility and give nothing; your neighbour
might cry to the  Lord against you, and you would incur
guilt.  10Give liberally and be ungrudging when you do so,
for on this account the Lord your God will bless you in all
your work and in all that you undertake.11  Since  there will
never  cease  to  be  some  in  need  on  the  earth,  I  therefore
command you,  “Open your hand to the poor and needy
neighbour in your land”. (Deuteronomy 15:1-11)
Critics  of  the  use  of  Deuteronomy  15:11  to  justify  laissez-faire
economics – or even the refusal of large-scale charity – have tended to
point first to the imperative associated with the indicative statement in
verse 11; there will never cease to be some in need, therefore open your
hand  to  the  poor  and  needy  neighbour.11 This  move  on  its  own,
however, does not capture the temporal structure of the text; in fact it
tends to replace a timeless indicative (there will never cease to be some
in need)  with  a  timeless  imperative  (open  your  hand to  the  poor).
More important, for our purposes at least, is the wider context. The
whole discussion of the needy neighbour, with the repeated command
to ‘open your hand’ is necessary because of the approach of the year of
remission,  when  (throughout  the  history  of  interpretation,
notwithstanding certain ambiguities in the text itself) all debts are to
be cancelled.12 The crucial claim – that there «will never cease to be
some in need on the earth»– is set in the context of a particular urgent
11 See for example the discussion in BEAVIS 2011, 210.
12 A recent discussion of the historical question of debt suspension and debt cancellation in
the ‘year of remission’ is in WAFAWANAKA 2014. 
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present need and an imminent future transformation. What looks out
of  context  like  a  de-temporalised  commentary  on  the  background
conditions of justice in general – there will always be «some in need»,
and we will need to set out general principles according to which they
can  be  helped  –  looks,  when  read  in  context,  more  like  a  specific
proposal about how to read the situation  now in the light of what is
coming. 
The key problem addressed by the text is that a loan to the needy
neighbour  just  before  the  year  of  debt-cancellation  is,  in  fact,  an
irrecoverable  gift,  because  it  will  never  be  paid  back.  Indeed,  this
transformation is effected in the text as the «loan» in verse 8 becomes a
«gift»  in  verse  9.  Given  the  impending  year  of  remission,  the
lender/giver  in  this  situation  retains  no  control  over  what  the
borrower/recipient  does  with the loan,  and no predictable bond of
reciprocity is established. The loan before the year of debt-cancellation
escapes the ordinary calculus of rights and responsibilities – debts –
based  on  the  symmetrical  and  simultaneous  involvement  of  the
parties. As we shall see, this shift from loan to gift – from reciprocal
obligation to non-returnable donation – in the scenario and in the text
provides the way in to a reading that places future generations in the
centre of the text. 
Consider,  first,  how  the  loan  immediately  before  the  year  of
remission – the loan that escapes or exceeds reciprocity, the loan that
becomes  a  gift  –  suggests  profound  vulnerability,  not  only  for  the
person who needs it but for the person from whom it is requested.
With the year of remission approaching, so without a framework of
reciprocal  obligations  to secure  the loan,  the lender has  – it  would
seem – no reliable calculus, in terms of likely future benefits, by which
to make a decision about whether, what and how much to lend. It is
hardly  surprising,  as  several  commentators  note,  that  the  text
envisages  reluctance  to  comply,  and  brings  in  a  range  of  possible
motivations. The loan/gift is to be made in order to secure a blessing
from the LORD (15:10), or in order not to incur guilt (15:9), or because
the needy person is kindred (15:7, «a member of your community»), or
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– as  our  core  quotation suggests  –  because  of  shared and ongoing
vulnerability, the ongoing threat of poverty, that might bring the one
who now holds wealth into the position of the needy person.
 There is an obvious parallel with the struggle, in the literature on
ethics, to find new and distinctive motivations for concern for future
generations – when the utilitarian calculus cannot operate reliably, and
the future person is not present to assert rights or express preferences.
Sometimes even in the ‘secular’ literature this search for motivation
(for  caring  about  future  generations)  is  assigned  to  the  theological
sphere. 13  
The ordinary rules governing interpersonal obligation hit a limit at
the temporal  break – the year of remission, and the break between
generations.  The  needy  neighbour,  like  the  future  person,  clearly
exercises agency after the year of remission, that is, beyond the divide
that  makes the  repayment  of  debt  impossible;  but  the  lender/giver
before the year of remission sees nothing of it and takes nothing back
from it. The irresolvable asymmetry created by this temporal gap – the
coming year  of  remission –  is,  as  can also  be  the  case with future
generations,  counterbalanced  by  the  acknowledgement  both  of
material connection and of similarity. The needy neighbour is kindred;
s/he inhabits the same space both culturally and socially (in the town)
and ecologically (in the land). In the same way, future generations can
be called into ethical discussion as people like us  - with at least some
broadly predictable needs and desires – and as people linked to us by
generational  succession.  Moreover  and  more  fundamentally,  the
neighbour  in  Deuteronomy is  capable  of  appearing  within  existing
structures of reciprocity and mutual obligation, of making a request or
bringing a need – even though that request or need pushes beyond the
boundaries of what can be thought or understood within the system.
In the same way, responsibility to future generations can be envisaged,
represented or spoken for, and can arise as an ethical question, even
though it might be at the limits of ethics. 
Verse  11,  on  this  reading,  draws  attention  to  the  continued
13 See the discussion of this in MUERS 2004.
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succession of  generations  and the  repeated need  for  non-reciprocal
giving.  «There  will  never  cease  to  be  some  in  need»;  the  year  of
remission, like the ‘problem of generations’, itself establishes a pattern
–  a  larger  pattern  of  paying  forward,  loans-converted-to-gifts,  the
writing off of unfinished business, as an integral part of what it is to
inhabit  the  land.  At  first  glance,  the  possibility  of  establishing this
pattern is predicated, in Deuteronomy, on a bounded community and
the perpetuation of a pattern of life. The writing off of debts applies to
neighbours and fellow-citizens, and specifically not to foreigners. The
loan to the needy neighbour is characterised as a loan in the first place
– and not immediately converted, textually, into a gift,  even though
that  is  what  it  will  become.  A  system  of  loans,  of  reciprocal
obligations, is re-inscribed even as it is about to stop making sense;
and it re-emerges on the other side of the year of remission, with the
next generation, the latest recipient of a non-returnable gift,  able to
pick up where the previous one left off. 
If we follow this line of thought, it looks as if it might be possible to
locate the ethical importance of future generations in the continuing
existence  of  a  particular  community  –  including  a  particular
community’s ordinary ethical practices. Justice to future generations
then becomes a matter of giving future generations what they need in
order to establish or maintain  a  system of  justice;  a  kind of  ‘meta-
justice’,  preserving  institutions,  memories,  texts,  and  laws,  the
institutional and social ecology as well as the physical ecology of the
land. This recognition of continuity – of the social and cultural as well
as  physical  connections  between  generations,  which  mean  that
intergenerational relations cannot be reduced simply to a division of
resources  –  is  an  important  component  of  any  response  to  the
‘problem of generations’. On its own, however, the mere assertion that
future generations are owed  some account of justice or some way of
establishing responsibility does not say enough. It does not allow for
the  disruptive  and  excessive  character  of  the  relation  to  future
generations  –  the  surrender  of  control  over  the  unrepeatable  and
unreturnable  gift.  To  use  Derrida’s  terms,  an  emphasis  on
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intergenerational community prioritises the xenia, the lineage and the
sustained chain of inheritance, and loses sight of the ways in which the
future person can also be xenos, the stranger/foreigner.14
If we think about the loan-gift in terms of the surrender of control to
or over the future, the resistance to the command anticipated by the
text – «do not be hard-hearted… be careful that you do not entertain a
mean thought» – can from this  perspective be linked to the fear of
death. One response to the fear of death – either in this text or certain
ethical accounts of future generations – might be found in the decision
to  secure  the  future  of  one’s  community,  to  live  on  through  one’s
children. Another, however, might be found in a basic reorientation of
the self towards the other. Within our text, this response is hinted at in
the repeated excessive demand that the gift to the needy neighbour –
the  gift  that  points  towards  the  future  –  must  be  willing  and
unconstrained  as  well  as  materially  unlimited.  The  loan/gift  is
supposed to be made, not only to an unlimited amount – «enough to
meet  the need,  whatever it  may be» – but  willingly  and without a
«mean thought». Not only refusal, but even hesitation or the bearing
of a grudge, incurs guilt (15:9).  Not only the specificity of individual
need and the individual’s situation, but also the deep formation of the
giver’s  character,  enter  the  picture  in  disorienting  ways.  Hostility,
meanness and hard-heartedness struggle against liberality and open-
handedness;  dispassionate  and  calculating  judgement  is,  the  text
suggests, impossible. Over against a putative claim to have accurately
assessed the need of the other and given exactly the right amount, no
more and no less, the text sets a further demand for self-surrender –
give liberally and be ungrudging, hold nothing back. This excess in the
text  resists  the  straightforward  re-incorporation  of  justice  to  future
generations  into  a  restatement  of  the  value  of  a  current  system  of
justice. 
14 DERRIDA 2000, 29.
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3. Faces of the Future: Rereading with Lévinas 
As Claire Elise Katz acknowledges when she takes Deuteronomy 15:8-
9 as the epigraph for a chapter on Lévinas, this summons to infinite or
unbounded responsibility before the face of the needy other is taken
up in  Lévinas’  ethics  as  first  philosophy.15 In  fact,  one  of  his  early
Talmudic discussions Lévinas addresses directly the question of the
temporality of Deuteronomy 15.16 With reference to an argument in the
Talmud about the messianic age, he briefly considers the claim that of
verse 11 «there will never cease to be some in need» in relation to the
contradictory claim, in verse 4, that there will be  nobody in need. In
Tractate Sanhedrin of the Babylonian Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel argues
that the only difference between the messianic age and the present
time will be the end of political oppression.17 What this implies is that
poverty  will  continue;  the  presumed  basis  for  this  claim  is
Deuteronomy  15:11  taken  in  combination  with  Deuteronomy  15:6
(«you will rule over many nations, but they will not rule over you»).
Lévinas, reasonably enough, argues that that the rabbi must be aware
of verse 4 and the promise that  there will  be nobody in need; and
moreover, it seems perverse to suggest that there will be poverty after
the coming of the messiah. How, then, is it possible to make sense of
the insistence that poverty continues indefinitely?  Lévinas’ response
takes  us  to  the  heart  of  his  «ethics  as  first  philosophy».  Poverty
continues, according to Lévinas, not as a sign of continuing economic
injustice, but as the otherness of the other person before whom I am
responsible,  to  whom  I  am  summoned  to  give,  and  in  relation  to
whom my spiritual  life  is  possible – the poverty  in the face of  the
other.18 
As Terry Veling notes, Lévinas’ insistence that ethical responsibility
is  inescapable,  that  there  is  a  perpetual  duty  of  vigilance,  spurs  a
15 KATZ 2003, 55.
16 Lévinas’ reading is discussed in MORGAN 2016, 243-7. The reading itself is LÉVINAS 1990,
59-97. 
17 Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 99a.
18 On the ‘essential poverty’ in the face, see LÉVINAS 1985, 86. 
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reading  of  Deuteronomy  15:11  in  terms  of  inexhaustible  and
inescapable responsibility – with no end in sight, because to bring an
end into  sight  would be  to  relativise  the  other  in  relation  to  some
end.19 What is particularly striking for our purposes is the idea that
poverty  or  need  persists  into  the  future,  and  not  merely  the
pessimistically-foreseeable  future  but  the  hoped-for  future,  the
messianic  age.  More  precisely,  what  persists  is  not  poverty  as  a
condition suffered by (some) individuals or groups (and not others),
but rather the other’s need as the point of origin of the responsible self.
Relationships  of  need  continue  because  otherwise  there  is  no
possibility of transcendence, no real future. 
The Lévinassian interpretation appears to contrast with the reading
of  this  text  offered by  Walter  Brueggemann in  a  recent  theological
commentary,  which  treats  Deuteronomy  15  as  the  linchpin  of  a
«covenant  economics»  founded  on  divine  generosity.  For
Brueggemann,  verse  4  promises  the  elimination  of  poverty  –  a
successful  «war  on  poverty»  –  as  a  result  of  the  practice  of  debt
cancellation and generous giving in response to need. The text as a
whole  calls  for  social  solidarity,  bridging  the  gap  between  the
relatively secure and the relatively vulnerable through the assurance
of  collective  blessing  and the  presence  of  YHWH as  mediator  and
judge (taking the «cry» of the needy person as a quasi-judicial term).20
The long-term consequence of following this radical economic model,
Brueggemann argues – here both following the logic of the text  and
appealing to his readers’ political imaginations – would indeed be the
end of poverty. Brueggemann uses Deuteronomy 15 to set out a radical
alternative vision of economics, grounded in divine generosity rather
than  the  fear  of  scarcity  –  by  implication,  intergenerationally
sustainable in a way that the present order is not, but also a vision of
what the future ought to be. 
The  contrast  need  not  be  an  insuperable  conflict.  Reading
Brueggemann’s  evocation  of  a  successful  «war  on  poverty»  in  the
19 VELING 2014, 37-8.
20 BRUEGGEMANN 2001, 162-70.
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context of Lévinas’ work grounds this vision and the restless action it
generates – for an end to poverty, for the meeting of all needs – in the
specific fact of being made responsible, being subjected to the call of
the other. It disturbs the general historical problem of «some in need»
with the specific and unsubstitutable presence of the needy neighbour.
Without this  unsubstitutable presence,  what we have is  a  totalising
programme of action – a total war on poverty – in which the subject is
never obliged to attend to the other and never deals with the question
of futurity. 
This  juxtaposition  brings  us  to  one  of  the  key  problems with  an
attempt to make links between responsibility to the needy neighbour
and responsibility to future generations. Reference to Lévinas reminds
us  that  the  needy  person  in  Deuteronomy  15  has  what  the  future
person does not have – a face that we encounter; and referring to Katz
and  feminist  commentators  on  Lévinas  reminds  us  that  the  future
person also does not have a specific embodied presence. The fact that
the encounter with the needy other calls forth open-handed and open-
ended giving – ‘enough to meet the need, whatever it may be’ – has as
its corollary the fact that there is, in each case, some specific need to be
discerned and met, some particular body to be cared for, some exercise
of  judgement  and  measurement  in  order  to  give  «enough».  The
problem with turning the future person into a needy neighbour is that
the case-by-case judgement about what counts as «enough» – which
seems to be integral  to the kind of  justice and responsibility called
forth  by  Deuteronomy  15  –  is  impossible  in  relation  to  future
generations. So, for that matter, is the embodied practice of generosity,
the opening of  the hand and the heart,  which seems in turn to  be
integral to judgements about what is required. I cannot pay attention to
the future person in his or her specificity. The temptation is either to
project an exact image of myself into the future, or to assume that I can
know nothing at all about future generations. It is not surprising in
this context that justice and responsibility to future generations easily
becomes a matter of numbers and aggregates – or becomes fraught
with impossibility. 
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Attempts to project overall future needs, and to plan for them, do tell
us  something  important  about  responsibility  to  future  generations.
They  recognise  common  human  embodiment  and  a  shared
environment  –  the  recurrence  of  basic  human  needs  and  the
perdurance of «the land» («there will never cease to be some in need
on the earth»). The worry, from the point of view of ethics, is that a
calculating focus on the future does not merely sideline, but actively
works against, the primary summons to responsibility in the face of
the  other.  Open-handed  attentiveness  is  not  merely  postponed  but
rendered  impossible,  because  it  always  has  to  be  subjected  to  the
calculus  of  future  costs  and  benefits.  The  ‘facelessness’  of  future
generations  tends  to  reinforce  an  approach  to  ethics  that  de-
emphasises attention both to specific unsubstitutable persons and to
human difference. 
Christian uses of Deuteronomy 15:11 – like those quoted earlier in
this article, from Rick Perry and from the Woolwich workhouse – are
particularly  prone  to  ‘faceless’  readings  that  deal  with  poverty  in
general,  with  predictable  futures  and  with  contextless  conclusions.
The  quotation  of  Deuteronomy  15:11  that  appears  in  the  New
Testament (Matthew 26:11 and parallels) places it, out of context, on
the  lips  of  Jesus  –  in  a  passage  widely  recognised  in  interpretive
tradition as problematic for proponents of Christian charity. A woman
anoints Jesus with valuable ointment; Jesus’ disciples (or unspecified
onlookers) criticise her action and suggest that the money should have
been given to the poor; and Jesus responds:
Why  do  you  trouble  this  woman?  She  has  performed  a
good service for me.  11For you always have the poor with
you, but you will not always have me…
One of the effects of this recontextualisation is to detach the indicative
statement about the ongoing existence of poverty – poverty carries on
indefinitely  –  both  from  a  specific  temporal,  social  and  legal
framework  (the  year  of  remission)  and  from  the  immediate
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confrontation  with  the  needy  neighbour  in  which  ethical
responsibility arises. In the  New Testament story there is, of course,
excessive generosity and open-handedness, an unreturnable gift and
care  for  embodied particularity;  it  is  displayed by the woman who
anoints Jesus. She, however, is rarely, in the interpretive tradition on
this  particular  text,  linked  with  «the  poor»  or  considered  as  their
representative. This in turn means that the unrepeatable particular act
of generosity becomes a one-off already safely consigned to the past,
rather  than  a  continuing  foundation  for  ethical  responsibility.
Disruptive  encounters  and  demands  are  sequestered  off  from  the
space of ordinary ethics. 
The woman’s action in anointing Jesus – and not giving money to the
poor – is, for the tradition of interpretation, an exceptional response to
an unrepeatable situation. It needs to be read in this way in order not
to derail the numerous injunctions to charity and almsgiving within
the  New  Testament.  Indeed,  there  are  interpretations  in  Christian
tradition that, rather on the lines suggested by Lévinas, read poverty
as relational and draw an imperative from the claim that the poor are
always with you. The saying of Jesus, says Calvin, is intended to direct
its hearers’ attention to the poor in order to spur charitable giving, to
teach them to interpret poverty as a call on charity (rather than, let us
say, as either a punishment or a praiseworthy spiritual  trial  for the
person who endures it).21 Most importantly for our purposes, however,
once  Deuteronomy  15:11  has  been  taken  out  of  its  earlier  textual
context,  separated  from  any  possible  disruptive  influence  from  its
New Testament context,  and invested with specific authority by being
placed on the lips of Jesus, it gains a new kind of power to speak and
shape the future. «You will always have the poor with you» can now
serve a theodicy, a justification of ongoing need and suffering as part
of  a  divine  plan  within  history  -  and  hence  also,  potentially,  an
injunction against open-handed generosity. 
Malthus’ Essay on the Principles of Population, famous or infamous at
the origins of political economy, criticises those who give too liberally
21 CALVIN 1995 [1555], 123.
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or open-handedly to the poor, precisely because they perpetuate the
dynamics that make poverty worse in every generation. As Malthus
describes it, to give to the needy just because they are needy, in the full
expectation that there will always be need and with no expectation of
return, is the precise opposite of what the laws of population suggest
as the prudent course of action. Poverty or need, in Malthus’ curious
theodicy,22 is not a relational condition calling forth an ethical response
from others; it is a self-referential condition spurring the sufferer on to
greater  efforts  of  industry  and  thrift.  Poverty,  or  (more  generally)
scarcity  as a  feature of  the natural  world,  does  enable  human self-
transcendence over time – through the progressive transformation and
colonisation of the natural world, and the growth of innovation and
creativity; but it does this only if there is  no liberal and open-handed
encounter  with  the  needy  neighbour.  Generosity,  from  this
perspective, perpetuates and worsens the wrongs of the present – and
this  is  in  part  because it  recognises  poverty  or  need  as  a  relational
condition,  a  call  to  responsibility,  rather  than  as  a  deficit  in  the
individual.
It is important to note that Malthusian political economy, with its
built-in  explanation  of  how  God  could  decree  the  continuance  of
poverty  and its  systemic  repudiation of  face-to-face  generosity,  was
used not to maintain the status quo but to advocate a programme of
radical  reform.  Patterns  of  political  and  economic  reasoning  that
project the present forwards – without interrogating the assumptions
and values on which the present is based – do enable a practice of
‘responsibility to future generations’, very often at the expense of those
members  of  present  generations  who do  not  fit  in.  Sacrificing  real
others in the present for the sake of a glorious future can easily be
made to look like the only responsible course of action. It  can look
very  irresponsible  towards  future  generations  to  lend to  the  needy
neighbour, as much as he or she needs, without any way of controlling
what he or she does next.
How  do  we  shape  ethical  thinking  about  the  future  that  takes
22 On Malthus’ theodicy, see SANTURRI 1982.
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account of material, social and institutional continuity – the fact that
future persons inherit from us and inhabit the same land – while also
heeding the disruptive or excessive call to responsibility, the demand
for open-handed and open-hearted response to the particular other? In
a final section, in dialogue with Hannah Arendt, I propose a way of
mediating these concerns – still  through attention to the reading of
Deuteronomy 15.
4. New Beginnings in Thinking: Rereading with 
Arendt
In the final chapters of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt traces the
contours  of  totalitarian  control,  first  in  the  inexorable  logic  of
ideologies, and second in the experience of loneliness. 23 At the centre
of  her  account  of  loneliness  is  Luther’s  arresting  reflection  (both
autobiographical and theological) on the «heart turned in on itself» –
the isolated self that refers only to itself and thinks only of itself. In
what Arendt notes as a «little-known remark» – but one that is fully
consonant with his wider project – Luther says that a lonely person
«always deduces one thing from another and thinks everything to the
worst».24 Totalitarian  extremism,  Arendt  argues,  follows  from  the
production of loneliness – the production of circumstances in which
the  only  option  is  to  think  an  ideology  through  to  its  logical
conclusions,  without  regard  to  their  implications  or  effects  in  the
world. The self under totalitarianism is cut off from all possibility of
thinking from the standpoint of another and hence of interrupting the
inexorable logic of ideology.
Arendt’s  transposition  of  this  experience  of  loneliness  into  the
political sphere invites its application to the different ways in which
the collective human future is envisioned and imagined – the ways in
which conclusions  about  the  future  are  drawn and enacted from a
23 ARENDT 1976, 474-9. 
24 ARENDT 1976, 477.
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present  starting-point.  The inexorable  reasoning behind the laws of
population,  in  Malthus  and  the  Malthusians,  produced  both  a
compelling expectation of «the worst» in the human future and – again
as Arendt suggests is the tendency of ideology allied to power – the
practices that made that pessimistic vision a reality. To write «the poor
you  have  always  with  you»  over  the  doors  of  the  workhouse  was
simultaneously to state the conclusion to an argument, to forecast the
condition of future generations, and (wittingly or unwittingly) to draw
attention to a policy that made that forecast more likely to come true.
The inexorability of ideology becomes the inexorability of a future that
continues,  and  projects  forward,  the  dynamics  and  systems  of  the
present – and justifies the actions that perpetuate them. To quote the
title of another of Arendt’s works, without the possibility of thinking
from the standpoint of another – without the plural public space to
form conscience and consciousness – there is no space «between past
and future»; the movement from the one to the other is inexorable.25 
Over against totalitarianism’s inexorable logics and the loneliness of
the totalitarian subject, Arendt musters two key sources of resistance -
the capacity to think, and the capacity to make or be a beginning. As
her  corpus  makes  clear,  these  are  intrinsically  social  and  political
capacities.  The  inability  to  think  is  the  inability  to  think  from  the
standpoint  of  another;  the  significance  of  natality,  the  beginning  that
each human being is and makes, is the capacity to act in the political
sphere.  The  isolated  subject  of  totalitarianism  cannot  entertain  or
admit a new beginning, either in thought or in reality – and cannot
admit a future that is not entirely bound by the past. In Lévinassian
terms,  he  or  she  cannot  recognise  the  poverty  of  the  face  and  the
responsibility that it implies; and, beyond this, he or she cannot enter
into  the  process  of  ‘open-hearted’  reasoning  and  discernment  that
would enable a proper response to the other. 
The emphasis in Arendt on thinking from the standpoint of another
shifts the discussion of justice and responsibility to future generations
into the sphere of the political. It encourages us to ask in Deuteronomy
25 ARENDT 2006.
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15 – and similar texts – about the content of the needy neighbour’s
«cry  to  the  LORD»  (Deuteronomy  15:9).  Is  it  simply  a  cry  of
inarticulate need that interrupts the chain of reasoning? If, as Walter
Brueggemann suggests, it is more like a legal deposition, we might be
able to understand it not only as ‘otherness’ but other thought. It is the
beginning of a new sequence of reasoning, or the inauguration of a
new public hearing. 
Reading  with  Arendt  in  this  way,  open-heartedness  becomes  the
opposite, not only of material selfishness, but of the heart and mind
turned in on itself – the single chain of reasoning indefinitely projected
into  the future (no matter  what the facts  are).  Open-heartedness  is
willingness to reason from the standpoint of another, not only to jump
to attention when another cries out. Thinking with Arendt allows us to
recognise how easy it is for talk about the suffering of helpless others,
or  about  our  duty  to  future  generations,  to  be  appropriated  for
totalitarian purposes.  
It should be noted, furthermore, that in Deuteronomy 15 the cry of
the  other  can  cause  its  subject  –  the  one  addressed  by  the
commandment and made responsible – to incur guilt (15:9). One little-
discussed  aspect  of  responsibility  to  future  generations  is  the
subjection of present actions to future judgement;  history, it  is said,
will be our judge. This subjection to future judgement can, of course,
be thought about in a way that re-performs the totalitarian logic of
inexorability – if we fail adequately to live up to the standards set by
the ideology, we will in due course incur guilt at the bar of the entirely
foreseeable future. Reading with Arendt,  however, produces a more
hopeful  –  although  also  far  less  controllable  –  account  of  the
judgements  and  reasonings  of  future  generations,  one  that  takes
account of the possibility of political and ethical change and of new
beginnings in political life. Future generations may «cry out», bring
charges  against  us  and  make  judgements  about  guilt  according  to
modes  of  reasoning  and  understanding  that  we  do  not  yet  know
about. Indeed, reading with Deuteronomy 15 and reading with Arendt
on totalitarianism, the cry of the neighbour – the outburst of resistant
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and critical thinking – can emerge  despite and  in the face of  persistent
hard-heartedness and tight-fistedness. 
What,  finally,  do  any  of  these  readings  say  about  the  work  of
theology in thinking responsibility to future generations? As we have
seen,  there  is  a  straightforward  and  rather  well-trodden  path,
particularly  in  the  age  of  modern  ideologies,  to  making  God  the
guarantor of a continuing state of affairs, projecting current dominant
reasonings about poverty, wealth, debt, and so forth, indefinitely into
the future. In an example of this, we have seen that Deuteronomy 15:11
can be pulled out of its context – particularly via its New Testament
recontextualisation  –  as  a  divine  statement  of  inevitability,  the
unarguable  starting-point  for  a  chain  of  reasoning  and  action  that
treats  both  future  generations  and  poverty  as  predictable  and
controllable phenomena. Treated as an authoritative statement about
the created order, it may require – and find – a theodicy in order to
quell  any  doubts  or  concerns,  but  it  does  not  admit  or  invite  the
attempt to think from the standpoint of another. When the text is read
back  into  context,  however,  I  suggest  that  the  appeal  to  divine
authority grounds, not the continuation of present conditions, but the
cry of the other –the possibility of a beginning and the inception of
thinking. 26 
26 Even in the New Testament recontextualisation of Deuteronomy 15:11, the action of the
woman  who  anoints  Jesus  makes  a  beginning  –  not  only  by  being  singular  and
unrepeatable, nor by being a minor aberration in an otherwise consistent set of events,
but by being remembered, represented and reasoned about (her story is told «wherever
the good news is proclaimed in the whole world», «in remembrance of her», Matthew
26:13).  Any account of how and why the poor are «always with you» will have to reckon
with the standpoint of another.
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